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T

HE CENTRAL PREMISE OF THIS CHAPTER

is that the demand for social science
knowledge is derived from the demand for institutional change.1 If this view
is correct then any claim by the social science disciplines and related
professions for public support depends on a credible promise that advances in social
science knowledge represent an efficient source of institutional innovation.
In work published in the early 1970s, Yujiro Hayami, Hans Binswanger, and I
extended the theory of induced technical change and tested it against the history of
agricultural development in the United States and Japan (Hayami and Ruttan 1971;
Binswanger and Ruttan 1978). The demonstration that technical change can be treated
as largely endogenous to the development process does not imply that the progress of
either agricultural or industrial technology can be left to an “invisible hand” that
drives technology along an “efficient” path determined by relative resource endowments. The capacity to advance knowledge in science and technology is itself a result
of a product of institutional innovation – “the great invention of the nineteenth century
was the invention of the method of invention” (Whitehead 1925, p. 96).
In this chapter I elaborate a theory of institutional innovation in which
institutional innovation is induced by changes in resource endowments and cultural
endowments and by technical change. I also consider the impact of advances in social
science knowledge on the supply of institutional change. After examining the forces
that act to shift the demand and supply of institutional innovation, the elements of a
more general model of institutional change are presented.

What Is Institutional Innovation?

I

NSTITUTIONS ARE THE RULES OF A SOCIETY or of organizations that facilitate coordination among people by helping them form expectations that each person can
reasonably hold in dealing with others. They reflect the conventions and ideologies
that have evolved in different societies regarding the behavior of individuals and
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groups relative to their own behavior and the behavior of others.2 In the area of
economic relations they have a crucial role in establishing expectations about the
rights to use resources in economic activities and about the partitioning of the income
streams resulting from economic activity: “institutions provide assurance respecting
the actions of others, and give order and stability to expectations in the complex and
uncertain world of economic relations.”3
In order to perform the essential role of forming reasonable expectations in
dealings among people, institutions must be stable for an extended time period. But
institutions, like technology, must also change if development is to occur.
Anticipation of the latent gains to be realized by overcoming the disequilibria
resulting from changes in factor endowments, cultural endowments, and technology
represents powerful inducements to institutional innovation (North and Thomas 1970;
Schultz 1975; Binswanger and Deininger 1997). The growing disequilibria in
resource allocation due to institutional constraints generated by economic growth
create incentives for political entrepreneurs or leaders to organize collective action to
bring about institutional change.4
This perspective on the sources of demand for institutional change is similar, in
some respects, to the traditional Marxian view.5 Marx considered technological
2

There is considerable disagreement regarding the use of the term “institution.” A distinction is often
made between the concepts of institution and organization (Hurwicz 1996). I find the broad view
which includes both concepts most useful. This is consistent with the view expressed by both
Commons (1950, p. 24) and Knight (1952, p. 51). This definition also encompasses the classification
employed by Davis and North (1971, pp. 8–9) and by Elster (1989, pp. 147–158). The more inclusive
definition is employed in order to be able to consider changes in the rules or conventions that govern
behavior (i) within economic units such as firms and bureaucracies, (ii) among economic units as in
the cases of the rules that govern market relationships, and (iii) between economic units and their
environment, as in the case of the relationship between a firm and a regulatory agency. It includes
policy, mechanism, and system innovations. North’s use of the term institution in his more recent work
(1991, 1994) is similar to the use of the term “culture” by anthropologists (Fogel 1992) and to my use
of the term “cultural endowment” (Figure 1). The distinction that I make between institutions and
cultural endowments is that institutions are the formal rules and arrangements that govern behavior
among and within organizations, while cultural endowments are the informal codes of behavior that
influence individual and group behavior.
3
See Runge (1981b, p. xv). Formal analysis of the role of institutions in providing assurance of
stability in economic relationships emerged from dissatisfaction with the implications of the
assumption of strict dominance of individual strategy in modern welfare economics (Sen 1967; Runge
1981a). In a less formal treatment, North argues, in a chapter on “Ideology and the Free Rider
Problem,” that shared ideological and ethical perspectives provide assurance that is lacking in models
built on the dominance of individual strategies (North 1981, pp. 45–58).
4
The role of special interest “distributional coalitions” in slowing society’s capacity to adopt new
technology and reallocate resources in response to changing conditions is a central theme in Olson
(1982, p. 74).
5
“At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production in society come in conflict
with existing relations of production, or – what is but a legal expression for the same thing – with the
property relations within which they had been at work before. From forms of development of the
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change as the primary source of institutional change. The induced innovation
perspective is somewhat more complex in that it considers that changes in cultural
and factor endowments are also important sources of institutional change. Nor is the
definition of institutional change employed in this chapter limited to the dramatic or
revolutionary changes of the type anticipated by Marx. Institutions such as property
rights and markets are more typically altered through the accumulation of
“secondary” or incremental institutional changes such as modifications in contractual
relations or shifts in the boundaries between market and non-market activities (Davis
and North 1971, p. 9).
There is a supply dimension as well as a demand dimension for institutional
change. Advances in knowledge in the social sciences (and in related professions such
as law, administration, planning, and social service) can reduce the cost of
institutional change in a manner somewhat similar to how advances in the natural
sciences reduce the cost of technical change. Advances in game theory have, during
the last several decades, enabled economists and political scientists to bring an
increasingly powerful set of tools to bear on the understanding of the processes of
institutional change (Schotter 1981; Ostrom 1990; Aoki 1996). In spite of the power
of these new tools, I continue to find the application of standard neoclassical microeconomic theory to interpret the sources of the demand and supply of institutional
change exceedingly useful.
Insistence that important advances in the understanding of the processes of
institutional innovation and diffusion can be achieved by treating institutional change
as endogenous to the economic system represents a clear departure from the tradition
of modern analytical economics.6 This does not mean that modern analytical

forces of production these relations turn into their fetters. Then comes the period of social revolution.
With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly
transformed” (Marx 1913, pp. 11–12). For a discussion of the role of technology in Marxian thought
see Rosenberg (1982, pp. 34–54).
6
The orthodox view was expressed by Samuelson (1948, pp. 221–222): “The auxiliary [institutional]
constraints imposed upon the variables are not themselves the proper subject of welfare economics but
must be taken as given.” Contrast this with the statement by Schotter (1981, p. 61): “We view welfare
economics as a study...that ranks the system of rules which dictate social behavior.” There are now five
fairly well defined “political economy” traditions that have attempted to break out of the constraints
imposed by traditional welfare economics and treat institutional change as endogenous. These include
(i) the theory of property rights, (ii) the theory of economic regulation, (iii) the theory of interest group
rent seeking, (iv) the liberal-pluralist theories of government, and (v) the neo-Marxian theories of the
state. In the property rights theories the government plays a relatively passive role; the economic
theory of regulation focuses on the electoral process; the rent-seeking and liberal-pluralist theories
concentrate on both electoral and bureaucratic choice processes; and the theory of the state attempts to
incorporate electoral, legislative choice, and bureaucratic choice processes. For a review and criticism
see Rausser, Lichtenberg, and Lattimore (1982).
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economics must be abandoned. On the contrary, the scope of modern analytical
economics is expanded by treating institutional change as endogenous.7
There is general agreement that institutional change has and continues to evolve
in response to long-term changes such as the pressure of population against land
resources or the rise in the price of labor relative to capital. But there has been
substantial disagreement within the social sciences about the role of purposeful or
rational design in institutional innovation.8 Those holding an “organic” perspective
argue that the fact that the institutions of civilization have been created by human
action “does not mean that man must also be able to alter them at will” (Hayek 1978,
p. 3).9 The organic view of the sources of institutional change is reinforced by a
theory of “unintended consequences” that runs through the work of Adam Smith,
Max Weber, and Frederich Hayek (Lal 1998).10 In contrast, the constructivist or
design perspective holds that advances in social science knowledge can play an
important role in the rational design of institutional reform and institutional
innovation.
Much of my work with Yujiro Hayami on induced institutional innovation reflects
an organic perspective. In other work, on the development of agricultural research
institutions for example, I have employed both organic and constructivist perspectives
(Ruttan 1982). I reject any demand to choose between the organic and constructivist
perspectives. They should be viewed as complements rather than as alternatives. I
also reject the ideological implication, advanced by some proponents of the organic
7

My use of the neoclassical microeconomic approach to interpret the process of institutional change is
closer in spirit to that of Hicks (1969) and to North and Thomas (1973) than to North’s more recent
work (North 1994). It is similar to that employed by Gary Becker in analyzing the institutions of the
family (Becker 1981; 1993). An important difference is that in my work I focus on the effects of longterm changes in the external environment that must be treated as exogenous by the agents who act to
bring about institutional change.
8
Schotter (1981, pp. 3–4) notes that in economics there have been, historically, two distinct
interpretations of the sources of institutional change – “organic” and “collectivist.” He identifies the
organic view with the work of Hayek and the collectivist view with the work of Commons. Hayek
(1978, pp. 3–22) uses the term “constructivism” rather than collectivist. The collectivist perspective, as
employed by Schotter, is similar in concept to the “designer” perspective as employed by Hurwicz
(1998)
9
Hayek was apparently referring to a statement by Karl Marx: “Men make their own history, but they
do not make it as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but
under circumstances directly formed, given and transmitted from the past” (Marx 1963, p. 15).
10
In an earlier work Hayek argued that it was misleading to divide all phenomena into those which are
“natural” and those which are “artificial.” He suggests a threefold classification: (i) phenomena which
are natural in the sense that they are wholly independent of human action, (ii) those unintended
patterns and regularities in human society that are due to human action but not to human design, and
(iii) those patterns and regularities that are the deliberate product of human design. He regarded the
explanation of the unintended patterns and regularities, which he termed “spontaneous order,” as the
proper task of social theory. He was, and remained, skeptical of constructivism because of the inability
of social theory to anticipate unintended consequences (Hayek 1967, pp. 96–105).
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approach, that the unintended consequences of institutional change preclude the
possibility of a rational or analytical approach to institutional reform and design. In
the next section of this chapter on demand for institutional innovation I employ an
organic approach to interpret a series of institutional changes in land and labor
relationships. In a following section on the supply of institutional innovation I employ
a constructivist or design perspective.

Demand for Institutional Innovation

I

N SOME CASES THE DEMAND

for institutional innovation can be satisfied by the

development of new forms of property rights, more efficient market institutions,
or even by evolutionary changes arising out of direct contracting by individuals at the
level of the community or the firm. In other cases, where externalities are involved,
substantial political resources may have to be brought to bear to organize non-market
institutions in order to provide for the supply of public goods. This section draws
from agricultural history to illustrate how changes in factor endowments, technical
change, and growth in product demand have induced change in property rights and
contractual arrangements.
The agricultural revolution that occurred in England between the fifteenth and the
nineteenth centuries involved a substantial increase in the productivity of land and
labor. It was accompanied by the enclosure of open fields and the replacement of
small peasant cultivators, who held their land from manorial lords, by a system in
which large farmers used hired labor to farm the land they leased from the landlords.
The First Enclosure Movement, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, resulted in the
conversion of open arable fields and commons to private pasture in areas suitable for
grazing. It was induced by expansion in the export demand for wool. The Second
Enclosure Movement in the eighteenth century involved conversion of communally
managed arable land into privately operated units. It is now generally agreed that
demand for changes in land tenure arrangements was largely induced by the growing
disequilibrium between the fixed institutional rent that landlords received under
copyhold tenures (with lifetime contracts) and the higher economic rents expected
from adoption of new technology, which became more profitable as a consequence of
higher grain prices and lower wages. When the land was enclosed there was a
redistribution of income from farmers to landowners and the disequilibrium was
reduced or eliminated.11

11

There has been a continuing debate among students of English agricultural history about whether the
rents that landowners received after enclosure were higher because (i) enclosed farming was more
efficient than open field farming, or (ii) enclosures redistributed income from farmers to landowners.
See Chambers and Mingay (1966), Dahlman (1980), and Allen (1982).
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In nineteenth-century Thailand, the opening of the nation to international trade
and the reduction in shipping rates to Europe following the completion of the Suez
Canal resulted in a sharp increase in the demand for rice. The land available for rice
production, which had been abundant, became more scarce. Investment in land
development for rice production for export became profitable. The rise in the
profitability of rice production for export induced a demand for the reform of
property rights in both land and man. Traditional rights in human property (corvee
and slavery) were replaced by more precise private property rights in land (fee-simple
titles) (Feeney 1982, 2002).
In Japan, at the beginning of the feudal Tokugawa period (1603–1867), peasants’
rights to cropland had been limited to the right to till the soil with the obligation to
pay a feudal land tax in kind. As the population grew, commercialization progressed
and irrigation and technology were developed to make intensive farming more
profitable. Some peasants divided their holdings into smaller units and leased them
out to ex-servants or extended family members. Some accumulated land through
mortgaging arrangements that made other peasants de facto tenants. As a result of the
accumulation of illegal leasing and mortgaging practices, peasants’ property rights in
land approximated those of a fee-simple title by the end of the Tokugawa period.
These rights were readily converted to the modern private property system in the
succeeding Meiji period (Hayami and Kikuchi 1981, p. 28).
Research conducted by Yujiro Hayami and Masao Kikuchi in the Philippines
during the late 1970s has enabled us to examine a contemporary example of the
interrelated effects of changes in resource endowments and technical change on the
demand for institutional change in land tenure and labor relations (Kikuchi and
Hayami 1980; Hayami and Kikuchi 1981; Hayami and Kikuchi 2000). The case is
particularly interesting because the institutional innovations occurred as a result of
private contracting among individuals – what Hayek termed “spontaneous order” and
in more recent literature has been referred to as “Coasian bargains” (Hayek 1978;
Olson 2000). The study is unique in that it is based on a rigorous analysis of
microeconomic data from a single village over a period of about 20 years.12
Land Tenure and Labor Relations in a Philippine Village
Between 1956 and 1976, rice production per hectare in the study village rose
dramatically, from 2.5 to 6.7 metric tons per hectare per year. This was due to two
technical innovations. In 1958, the national irrigation system was extended to the
village. This permitted double-cropping to replace single-cropping, thereby more than
doubling the annual production per hectare of rice land. The second major technical
change was the introduction in the late 1960s of modern high-yielding rice varieties.
The diffusion of modern varieties was accompanied by increased use of fertilizer and
12

For additional case studies using the framework employed in this chapter see Feeney (1988)
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pesticides and by the adoption of improved cultural practices such as straight-row
planting and intensive weeding.
Population growth in the village was rapid. Between 1966 and 1976 the number
of households rose from 66 to 109 and the population rose from 383 to 464, while
cultivated area remained virtually constant. The number of landless laborer
households increased from 20 to 54. In 1976, half of the households in the village had
no land to cultivate, not even land for rent. The average farm size declined from 2.3
hectares to 2.0 hectares.
The land is farmed primarily by tenants. In 1976, only 1.7 hectares of the 108
hectares of cropland in the village were owned by village residents. Traditionally,
share tenancy was the most common form of tenure. In both 1956 and 1966, 70
percent of the land was farmed under share tenure arrangements. In 1963, a new
agricultural land reform code was passed which was designed to break the political
power of the traditional landed elite and to provide greater incentives to peasant
producers of basic food crops.13 A major feature of the new legislation was an
arrangement that permitted tenants to initiate a shift from share tenure to leasehold,
with rent under the leasehold set at 25 percent of the average yield for the previous
three years. Implementation of the code between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s
resulted in a decline in the percentage of land farmed under share tenure to 30
percent.
The shift from share tenure to lease tenure was not, however, the only change in
tenure relationships that occurred between 1966 and 1976. There was a sharp increase
in the number of plots farmed under subtenancy arrangements. The number increased
from one in 1956 to five in 1966 and 16 in 1976. Subtenancy is illegal under the land
reform code. The subtenancy arrangements are usually made without the consent of
the landowner. All cases of subtenancy were on land farmed under a leasehold
arrangement. The most common subtenancy arrangement was 50-50 sharing of costs
and output.
It was hypothesized that an incentive for the emergence of the subtenancy
institution was that the rent paid to landlords under the leasehold arrangement was
below the equilibrium rent – the level that would reflect both the higher yields of rice
obtained with the new technology and the lower wage rates implied by the increase in
population pressure against the land.

13

Although the passage and implementation of the Land Reform Code of 1963 was exogenous to the
economy of the village, the land reform of the 1960s has been interpreted as the result of efforts by an
emerging industrial elite to simultaneously break the political power of the more conservative
land-owning elite and to provide incentives to peasant producers to respond to the rapid growth in
demand for marketable surpluses of wage goods, primarily rice and maize, needed to sustain rapid
urban industrial development. Thus, the Land Reform Code can be viewed as an institutional
innovation designed to facilitate realization of the opportunities for economic growth that could be
realized through rapid urban industrial development. See Ruttan (1969).
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To test this hypothesis, market prices were used to compute the value of the
unpaid factor inputs (family labor and capital) for different tenure arrangements
during the 1976 wet season. The results indicate that the share-to-land was lowest and
the operators’ surplus was highest for the land under leasehold tenancy. In contrast,
the share-to-land was highest and no surplus was left for the operator who cultivated
the land under the subtenancy arrangement (Table 1). Indeed, the share-to-land when
the land was farmed under subtenancy was very close to the sum of the share-to-land
plus the operators’ surplus under the other tenure arrangement.
Table 1. Factor Shares of Rice Output per Hectare, 1976 Wet Season
Factor sharesa
Number
of Plots

Area
(ha)

Rice
Output

Current
Inputs

Landowner

Leasehold
land

44

67.7

Share
tenancy land

30

29.7

Subtenancy
land

16

9.1

2,889
(100.0)
2,749
(100.0)
3,447
(100.0)

657
(22.7)
697
(25.3)
801
(23.2)

567
(19.6)
698
(25.4)
504
(14.6)

SubTenancy

Total

Labor

Capitalb

Operators’
Surplus

567
(19.6)
698
(25.4)
1,305
(37.8)

918
(31.8)
850
(30.9)
1,008
(29.3)

337
(11.7)
288
(10.5)
346
(10.1)

410
(14.2)
216
(7.9)
-13
(-0.4)

--------kg/ha--------

0
(0)
0
(0)
801c
(23.2)

Source: Hayami and Kikuchi (1981, pp. 111–113)
a

Percentage shares are shown in parentheses.
Sum of irrigation fee and paid and/or imputed rentals of carabaos, tractors, and other machines.
c
Rents to subleasors in the case of pledged plots are imputed by applying the interest rate of 40 percent
per crop season (a mode in the interest rate distribution in the village).
b

The results are consistent with the hypothesis. A substantial portion of the
economic rent was captured by the leasehold tenants in the form of operators’ surplus.
On the land farmed under a subtenancy arrangement, the rent was shared between the
leaseholder and the landlord.
A second institutional change, induced by higher yields and the increase in
population pressure, has been the emergence of a new pattern of employer-labor
relationship between farm operators and landless workers. According to the
traditional system called hunusan, laborers who participated in the harvesting and
threshing activity received a one-sixth share of the paddy (rough rice) harvest. By
1976, most of the farmers (83 percent) adopted a system called gamma, in which
participation in the harvesting operation was limited to workers who had performed
the weeding operation without receiving wages.
The emergence of the gamma system can be interpreted as an institutional
innovation designed to reduce the wage rate for harvesting to a level equal to the
marginal productivity of labor. In the 1950s, when the rice yield per hectare was low
and labor was less abundant, the one-sixth share may have approximated an
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equilibrium wage level. With the higher yields and the more abundant supply of labor,
the one-sixth share became larger than the marginal product of labor in the harvesting
operation.14
To test the hypothesis that the gamma system was adopted rapidly primarily
because it represented an institutional innovation that permitted farm operators to
equate the harvesters’ share of output to the marginal productivity of labor, imputed
wage costs were compared with the actual harvesters’ shares (Table 2). The results
indicate that a substantial gap existed between the imputed wage for the harvesters’
labor alone and the actual harvesters’ shares. This gap was eliminated if the imputed
wages for harvesting and weeding labor were added. Those results are consistent with
the hypothesis that the changes in institutional arrangements governing the use of
production factors were induced when disequilibria between the marginal returns and
the marginal costs of factor inputs occurred as a result of changes in factor
endowments and technical change. Institutional change, therefore, was directed
toward the establishment of a new equilibrium in factor markets.15
It is important to recognize that subtenancy and gamma contracts were the
institutional innovations arrived at by voluntary agreements among farm operators,
tenants, and laborers. The land reform laws gave leasehold tenants strong protection
of their tenancy rights. It gave them the right to continue tilling the soil at an
institutional rent that was lower than the economic rent. But the laws prohibited
tenants from renting their land to someone else who might utilize it more efficiently,
when they became elderly or found more profitable off-farm employment, for
example. Subtenancy reduced such inefficiency due to the institutional rigidity in the
land rental market resulting from the land reform programs. Likewise, the gamma
system counteracted the institutional rigidity in the labor market associated with the
institutional wage rate based on the traditional harvest share.
It might appear that these institutional innovations increased efficiency at the
expense of equity. But, if the subtenancy system had not been developed, the route
would have been closed for some of the landless laborers to become farm operators
and use their skills more profitably. If the wage rate for harvesting work had been
raised in the absence of the implicit gamma contract, it would have encouraged
mechanization in threshing, thereby reducing both employment and labor earnings.
14

Real wages for agricultural labor declined significantly between the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s in
the Philippines. See Khan (1977). Thus, while we cannot be certain that the labor market was in
equilibrium in the 1950s, it is clear that the degree of disequilibrium widened, as a result of both higher
yields and lower wage rates, prior to the introduction and diffusion of the gamma system.
15
A second round of technical and institutional changes occurred in the 1990s. Nonfarm employment
opportunities have expanded as a result of better transport to the metropolitan Manila area and the
location of a small metal craft firm in the village. Higher wage rates have induced the substitution of
small portable threshing machines for manual rice threshing. The labor share for harvesting has
declined and a new form of labor contract, referred to as new hunusan, has emerged. As a result of the
new nonfarm employment opportunities, the incomes of landless labor households have risen (Hayami
and Kikuchi 2000).
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Table 2. Comparison Between the Imputed Value of Harvesters’ Share and
Imputed Cost of Gamma Labor
Based on employers’ data
Number of working days of
gamma labor (days/ha)a
Weeding
Harvesting/threshing
Imputed cost of gamma labor
(P/ha)b
Weeding
Harvesting/threshing
Total
Actual share of harvesters:
(1) In kind (kg/ha)c
(2) Imputed value (P/ha)d
(2) – (1)

Based on employers’ data

20.9
33.6

18.3
33.6

167.2
369.6
536.8

146.4
369.6
516.0

504.0
504.0

549.0
549.0

-32.8

33.0

Source: Hayami and Kikuchi (1981, p. 121)
a

Includes labor of family members who worked as gamma laborers.
Imputation using market wage rates (daily wage = P8.0 for weeding, PI 1.0 for harvesting).
c
One-sixth of output per hectare.
d
Imputation using market prices (I kg = PI).
b

In the case reviewed here the induced innovation process leading toward the
establishment of equilibrium in factor markets occurred very rapidly in spite of the
fact that many of the transactions – between landlords, tenants, and laborers – were
less than fully monetized. Informal contractual arrangements or agreements were
utilized. The subleasing and the gamma labor contract evolved without the
mobilization of substantial political activity or bureaucratic effort. Indeed, the
subleasing arrangement evolved in spite of legal prohibition. Where substantial
political and bureaucratic resources must be mobilized to bring about technical or
institutional change, the changes occur much more slowly, as in the cases of the
English enclosure movements and Thai and Japanese property rights referred to at the
beginning of this section.
The examples of institutional change advanced in this section, such as the
enclosure in England and the evolution of private property rights in land in Japan and
Thailand, have contributed to the development of a more efficient market system.
Institutional changes of this type are profitable for society only if the costs involved
in the assignment and protection of rights are smaller than the gains from better

SOCIAL SCIENCE KNOWLEDGE AND INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION

11

resource allocation. If those costs are very high, it may be necessary to design
non-market institutions in order to achieve more efficient resource allocation.16

The Supply of Institutional Innovation

T

HE DISEQUILIBRIA IN ECONOMIC relationships associated with economic
growth, such as technical change leading to the generation of new income
streams and changes in relative factor endowments, have been identified as important
sources of demand for institutional change. But the sources of supply of institutional
innovation are less well understood (Olson 1968; Ostrom 1990). The factors that
reduce the cost of institutional innovation have received only limited attention by
economists or by other social scientists.
In the Philippines village case discussed earlier, innovations in tenure and labor
market institutions were supplied, in response to the changes in demand generated by
changing factor endowments and new income streams, through the individual and
joint decisions of owner-cultivators, tenants, and laborers. But even at this level it was
necessary for gains to the innovators to be large enough to offset the risk of ignoring
the land reform prohibitions against subleasing and the transaction costs involved in
changing traditional harvest-sharing arrangements. While mobilization of substantial
political resources was not required to introduce and extend the new land and labor
market institutions, the distribution of political resources within the village did
influence the initiation and diffusion of the institutional innovations.
The supply of major institutional innovations necessarily involves the
mobilization of substantial political resources by political entrepreneurs and
innovators. It is useful to think in terms of a supply schedule of institutional
innovation that is determined by the marginal cost schedule facing political
entrepreneurs as they attempt to design new institutions and resolve the conflicts
among interest groups (or suppression of opposition when necessary). It was
hypothesized that institutional innovations will be supplied if the expected return
from the innovation that accrues to the political entrepreneurs exceeds the marginal
cost of mobilizing the resources necessary to design and introduce the innovation. To
the extent that the private return to the political entrepreneurs is different from the
social return, the institutional innovation will not be supplied at a socially optimum
level.17 If the institutional innovation is expected to result in a loss to a dominant
16

Demsetz (1964) has pointed out that the relative costs of using market and political institutions are
rarely given explicit consideration in the literature on market failure. An appropriate way of
interpreting the “public goods” vs. “private goods” issue is to ask whether the costs of providing a
market are too high relative to the cost of non-market alternatives. A similar point is made by Hurwicz
(1972).
17
See, for example, Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young (1971). For a review and extension of
concepts of political entrepreneurship see Guttman (1982).
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political bloc, the innovation may not be forthcoming even if it is expected to produce
a large net gain to society as a whole. And socially undesirable institutional
innovations may occur if the returns to the entrepreneur or the interest group exceed
the gains to society (Tullock 1967; Krueger 1974; Tollison 1982).
The failure of many developing countries to institutionalize the agricultural
research capacity needed to take advantage of the large gains from relatively modest
investments in technical change may be due, in part, to the divergence between social
returns and the private returns to political entrepreneurs. In the mid-1920s, for
example, agricultural development in Argentina appeared to be proceeding along a
path roughly comparable to that of the United States. Mechanization of crop
production lagged slightly behind that in the United States. Grain yields per hectare
averaged slightly higher than in the United States. In contrast to the United States,
however, output and yields in Argentina remained relatively stagnant between the
mid-1920s and the mid-1970s. It was not until the late 1970s that Argentina began to
realize significant gains in agricultural productivity. Part of this lag in Argentine
agricultural development was due to the disruption of export markets in the 1930s and
1940s. Students of Argentine development have pointed to the political dominance of
the landed aristocracy, to the rising tensions between urban and rural interests, and to
inappropriate domestic policies toward agriculture (de Janvry 1973; Smith 1969,
1974; Cavallo and Mundlak 1982). The Argentine case would seem to represent a
case where the bias in the distribution of political and economic resources imposed
exceptionally costly delays in the institutional innovations needed to take advantage
of the relatively inexpensive sources of growth that technical change in agriculture
could have made available.
Cultural endowments, including religion and ideology, exert a strong influence on
the supply of institutional innovation. They make some forms of institutional change
less costly to establish and impose severe costs on others. For example, the traditional
moral obligation in the Japanese village community to cooperate in joint communal
infrastructure maintenance has made it less costly to implement rural development
programs than in societies where such traditions do not prevail. These activities had
their origin in the feudal organization of rural communities in the pre-Meiji period.
But practices such as maintenance of village and agricultural roads and of irrigation
and drainage ditches through joint activities in which all families contribute labor
were still practiced in well over half of the hamlets in Japan as recently as 1970
(Ishikawa 1981). The traditional patterns of cooperation have represented an
important form of social capital on which to erect modern forms of cooperative
marketing and joint farming activities. Similar cultural resources are not available in
South Asian villages where, for example, the caste structure inhibits cooperation and
encourages specialization (Lal 1998; Ruttan 2003, pp. 232–235).
Likewise, the adoption of new ideology may reduce the cost to political
entrepreneurs of mobilizing collective action for institutional change. For example,
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the Jeffersonian concept of agrarian democracy provided ideological support for the
series of land ordinances culminating in the Homestead Act of 1862, which
established the legal framework designed to encourage an owner-operator system of
agriculture in the American West (Cochrane 1979, pp. 41–47, 179–188). Strong
nationalist sentiment in Meiji, Japan, reflected in slogans such as “A Wealthy Nation
and Strong Army” (Fukoku Kyohei), helped mobilize the resources needed for the
establishment of vocational schools and agricultural and industrial experiment
stations (Hayami and Kikuchi 1981). In China, communist ideology, reinforced by the
lessons learned during the guerrilla period in Yenan, inspired the mobilization of
communal resources to build irrigation systems and other forms of social overhead
capital (Schran 1975). Thus, ideology can be a critical resource for political
entrepreneurs and an important factor affecting the supply of institutional
innovations.18
Advances in social sciences that improve knowledge relevant to the design of
institutional innovations that are capable of generating new income streams or that
reduce the cost of conflict resolution act to shift the supply of institutional change to
the right. Throughout history, improvements in institutional performance have
occurred primarily through the slow accumulation of successful precedent or as
by-products of expertise and experience. Institutional change was generated through
the process of trial and error much in the same manner that technical change was
generated prior to the invention of the research university, the agricultural experiment
station, or the industrial research laboratory. With the institutionalization of research
in the social sciences and related professions, the process of institutional innovation
has begun to proceed much more deliberately; it has become increasingly possible to
substitute social science knowledge and analytical skill for the more expensive
process of learning by trial and error.
The research that led to advances in our understanding of the production and
consumption of rural households in less developed countries represents an important
example of the contribution of advances in social science knowledge to the design of
more efficient institutions (Schultz 1964; Nerlove 1974; Binswanger et al. 1981). In a
number of countries this research has led to the abandonment of policies that viewed
peasant households as unresponsive to economic incentives. And it has led to the
design of policies and institutions to make more productive technologies available to
peasant producers and to the design of more efficient price policies for factors and
products.
In the following section I present a case study of the contribution of advances in
social science knowledge to the design of a contemporary institutional innovation –
18

I do not, in this chapter or in my book Social Science Knowledge and Economic Development
(Ruttan 2003), attempt to advance or draw on formal models of trial and error or unintended
consequences as a source of institutional change. Nelson and Winter have advanced a theory of
technical change based on random evolutionary processes (Nelson and Winter 1982).
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an emissions trading system designed to reduce the transaction costs of controlling
sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions – an important industrial pollutant. Advances in
economic knowledge led to an understanding of the very large cost reductions that
could be achieved by designing a “constructed market” to replace the “command and
control” approach to the management of SO2 emissions.
Constructed Markets for Emissions Trading
The concept behind the design of a constructed market for the control of SO2
pollutants is fairly simple. It is based on the realization that the behavioral sources of
the pollution problem can often be traced to poorly defined property rights in open
access natural resources such as air and water.19 A system of property rights and
tradable permits for the management of pollution was first proposed in the late 1960s
by Crocker (1966) and Dales (1968a, 1968b). The suggested institutional innovation
did not emerge from its inventors in a fully operational form. Their proposals were
followed by a large theoretical and empirical literature by resource and environmental
economists (Bohm 1985). Design and implementation involved an extended process
of “learning by doing” and “learning by using.”
Proposals to replace the command and control approach by Presidents Johnson
and Nixon by effluent fees or taxes on pollutants were dismissed as impractical and
characterized by environmental activists as a “license to pollute.” Beginning in the
mid-1980s, however, a series of events conspired to make a more market oriented
approach to reducing SO2 emissions politically feasible (Taylor 1989, pp. 28–34;
Hahn and Stavins 1991; Stavins 1998). One was the predilection of President George
H.W. Bush in favor of a market-oriented approach to environmental policy. Another
was the enthusiasm of Environmental Protection Agency administrator William Reilly
and a number of key staff members in the Executive Office of the President for
validating Bush’s desire to be known as “the environmental president.” There was
also bipartisan support in key Congressional committees for a variety of market-based
approaches to environmental policy.
Within the environmental community, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)
began to differentiate itself from the rest of the environmental community by
advocating market-based approaches as early as the mid-1980s. In 1989 EDF staff
began to work closely with the White House staff in drafting an early version of
proposed legislation. The credibility of the effort was enhanced by the fact that EPA
Administrator Reilly, formerly president of the Conservation Foundation, was a
“card-carrying” environmentalist. Executives of several major corporations,
influenced by subtle lobbying by the EDF, commented favorably on the emissions
trading proposals.
19

This section draws heavily on Ruttan (2001, pp. 511–516). For a retrospective perspective on the use
of tradable permits see Tietenberg (2002).
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The design of the SO2 emissions trading system advanced in the Clean Air Act of
1990 drew on earlier EPA experience. The EPA began experimenting with emissions
trading permits in 1974. The early programs included the elimination of lead in
gasoline, the phase-out of chlorofluorocarbons and halons in refrigeration, and the
reduction of water pollution from nonpoint sources. The early programs had a mixed
record. They were typically grafted onto existing command-and-control programs.
The difficulty of converting from command-and-control programs encountered
substantial transaction costs. These experiences did, however, provide important
lessons for the design of more market oriented trading programs in the 1990s.
The Clean Air Act created a national market for SO2 allowances for coal-burning
electrical utilities. The commodity exchanged in the SO2 emissions trading program is
a property right to emit SO2 that was created by the EPA and allocated to individual
firms. A firm can make allowances that had been issued to it available to be traded to
other firms by reducing its own emissions of the pollutant below its own baseline
level. In 1995, the program’s first year, 110 of the nation’s dirtiest coal-burning plants
were included in the program. The affected plants were allowed to emit 2.5 pounds of
SO2 for each million British thermal units (Btu) of energy that they generated. During
Phase II, initially projected to begin in 2000, almost all coal-burning plants were
scheduled to be included and allowances for each plant were to be reduced to 1.2
pounds per million Btu. Utilities that “overcomply” by reducing their emissions more
than required may sell their excess allowances. Utilities that find it more difficult, or
expensive, to meet the requirements may purchase allowances from other utilities.
The evidence available at the time this chapter was completed suggests that
emissions trading has been even more cost effective than originally anticipated. Prior
to initiation of the program, the utility industry had complained that reducing SO2 in
amounts sufficient to meet the projected target (down from about 19 million tons in
1980 to 8.95 million tons in 2000) might cost as much as $1,500 per ton. By the late
1990s allowances were being sold in the $100–150 range. The decline in the cost of
abatement has been due in part to technical changes in coal mining and deregulation
of rail transport, which have lowered the cost of low sulfur coal to mid-western power
producers. It has also been due to technical changes in fuel blending and SO2
scrubbing that were induced by the introduction of performance-based allowance
trading. As a result benefits have substantially exceeded early estimates (Joskow,
Schmalensee, and Bailey 1998).
The successful experience with SO2 emissions trading illustrates a very important
principle in inventing new property rights institutions to manage formerly open
access resources. In a now classic paper Coase (1960) argued that when only a few
decision makers are involved in the generation of externalities, the two parties, if left
to themselves, will voluntarily negotiate new institutional mechanisms – rules and
payments – that result in a reduction of the externalities to an acceptable level.
However important the Coase theorem might be for understanding the small
institutional innovations in the Philippine village case presented earlier in this
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chapter, it has little relevance to most contemporary large-scale externality problems.
The important externality problems that concern society today – such as SO2
pollution, ozone pollution or the greenhouse gases responsible for global climate
change – typically involve large numbers of polluters and even larger numbers of
persons affected by the externalities. In contrast to the evolution of a “natural
market,” government must establish the conditions necessary for a “constructed”
market to function. In the SO2 case it was necessary for an outside principal, the U.S.
Congress, to define the size (or the boundaries) of the resource, in this case the
maximum tons of SO2 emissions, and to establish the trading rules. The social science
effort involved in the design and implementation of the institutional arrangements to
confront such problems requires the mobilization of large economic and political
resources.

Toward a More Complete Model of Induced Innovation

T

HE ELEMENTS OF A PATTERN

(or structural) model that maps the general
equilibrium relationships among changes in resource endowments, cultural
endowments, technology, and institutions are presented in Figure 1.20 The model goes
beyond the conventional general equilibrium model in which resource endowments,
technologies, institutions, and culture (conventionally designated as tastes) are
given.21 In the study of long-term social and economic change the relationships
among the variables must be treated as recursive and dynamic (Harsanyi 1960). The
formal microeconomic models that are employed to analyze the supply and demand
for technical and institutional change can be thought of as “nested” within the general
equilibrium framework of Figure 1.
An important advantage of the pattern model outlined in Figure 1 is that it avoids
the necessity of choosing between a materialist conception of human action, in which
agents mechanically respond to changes in resource endowments, and an idealist
20

Fusfeld used the term “pattern” or “Gestalt” model to describe a form of analysis that links the
elements of a general pattern together by logical connections. The recursive multi-causal relationships
of the pattern model imply that the model is always “open” – “it can never include all of the relevant
variables and relationships necessary for a full understanding of the phenomenon under investigation”
(Fusfeld 1980, p. 33). Ostrom uses the term framework rather than pattern model. “The framework for
analyzing problems of institutional choice illustrates the complex configuration of variables when
individuals ... attempt to fashion rules to improve their individual and joint outcomes. The reason for
presenting this complex array of variables as a framework rather than a model is precisely because one
cannot encompass the degree of complexity within a single model” (Ostrom 1990, p. 214).
21
In economics the concept of cultural endowments has traditionally been subsumed under the concept
of “tastes” which are regarded as “given” – that is, not subject to economic analysis (Stigler and
Becker 1977). I use the term cultural endowments to capture those dimensions of culture that have
been transmitted from the past. Contemporary changes in institutions, for example, can be expected to
“harden” into the next generation’s cultural endowments.
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conception of human action, in which agents respond only to subjective changes in
cultural endowments (such as religion or ideology). Another advantage of the “pattern
model” outlined in Figure 1 is that it helps to identify areas of ignorance. Our
capacity to model and test the relationships between resource endowments and
technical change is relatively strong. Our capacity to model and test the relationships
between cultural endowments and either technical or institutional change is relatively
weak. The model is also useful in identifying the model components that enter into
other attempts to account for secular economic and social change. Failure to analyze
historical change in a general equilibrium context tends to result in a unidimensional
perspective on the relationships bearing on technical and institutional change.22

Figure 1. Interrelationships Between Changes in Resource Endowments,
Cultural Endowments, Technology, and Institutions
Source: Hayami and Ruttan 1985

22

Induced innovation theory should be viewed as a diagnostic tool. Accurate prediction is not an
appropriate test of the theory. If, for example, an increase in population pressure against land resources
fails to induce the expected innovation in property rights institutions, the appropriate response is to
augment the model. Thus in my own work I employ induced innovation theory not to predict the
effects of changes in resource endowments, technology, institutions and culture but rather as a guide to
a “dialogue with data.”
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For example, historians working within the Marxist tradition often tend to view
technical change as dominating both institutional and cultural change. In his book
Oriental Despotism, Wittfogel (mistakenly) views the irrigation technology used in
wet rice cultivation in East Asia as determining political organization (Wittfogel
1957). In terms of Figure 1 his primary emphasis was on the impact of changes in
resources and technology on institutions (C) and (B).
A serious misunderstanding can also be observed in the neo-Marxian critiques of
the “green revolution” in rice production in Asia (Cleaver 1972; Hayami and Ruttan
1985, pp. 336–345). These criticisms have focused attention almost entirely on the
impact of technical change on labor and land tenure relations. Both the radical and
populist critics have emphasized relation (B). But they have tended to ignore
relationships (A) and (C).23 This has led to repeated failure to identify effectively the
separate effects of population growth and technical change on the growth and
distribution of income. The analytical power of the more complete induced
innovation model was illustrated in the work by Hayami and Kikuchi, discussed
earlier in this chapter, on the impact of both technical change and population growth
on changes in land tenure and labor market relationships in the Philippines.
Economists such as Coase (1960) and Alchian and Demsetz (1973) identify a
primary function of property rights as guiding incentives to achieve greater
internalization of externalities. They consider that the clear specification of property
rights reduces transaction costs in the face of growing competition for the use of
scarce resources as a result of population growth and/or growth in product demand.
North and Thomas, building on the Alchian-Demsetz paradigm, attempted to explain
the economic growth of Western Europe between 900 and 1700 primarily in terms of
changes in property institutions.24 During the eleventh and thirteenth centuries the
pressure of population against increasingly scarce land resources induced innovations
in property rights that in turn created profitable opportunities for the generation and
adoption of labor-intensive technical changes in agriculture. The population decline in
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was viewed as a primary factor leading to the
demise of feudalism and the rise of the national state (line C). These institutional
changes in turn opened up new possibilities for economies of scale in nonagricultural production and in trade (line b).
Mancur Olson (1968, 1982) has emphasized the proliferation of institutions as a
source of economic decline. He also regards broad-based encompassing organizations
23

A major limitation of the Marxian model is the emphatic rejection of a causal link between
demographic change and technical and institutional change (North 1981, pp. 60–61). This blindness to
the role of demographic factors, and to the impact of relative resource endowments, originated in the
debates between Marx and Malthus. An attempt to correct this deficiency represents the major
innovation of the “cultural materialism” school of anthropology. See Harris (1979, Chapter 2).
24
See North and Thomas (1970, pp. 1–17a; 1973). For a critical perspective on the North-Thomas
model see Field (1981). Field is critical of North and Thomas for treating institutional change as
endogenous.
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as having incentives to generate growth and redistribute incomes to their members
with little excess burden. For example, a broadly based coalition that encompasses the
majority of agricultural producers is more likely to exert political pressure for
growth-oriented policies that will enable its members to obtain a larger share of a
larger national product than a smaller organization that represents the interests of the
producers of a single commodity. Small organizations representing narrow interest
groups are more likely to pursue the interests of their members at the expense of the
welfare of other producers and the general public. In contrast, an even more broadly
based farmer-labor coalition would be more concerned with promoting economic
growth than an organization representing a single sector. But large groups, in Olson’s
view, are inherently unstable because rational individuals will not incur the costs of
contributing to the realization of the large group program – they have strong
incentives to act as free riders. As a result, organizational “space” in a stable society
will be increasingly occupied by special interest “distributional coalitions.” These
distributional coalitions make political life more divisive. They slow down the
adoption of new technologies (line b) and limit the capacity to reallocate resources
(line c). The effect is to slow down economic growth or in some cases initiate a
period of economic decline.25
The relationships in the lower left-hand corner of Figure 1 (dashed lines) have
received relatively little attention from economists. The classic analysis by Weber
(1958) of the impact of the Protestant Reformation, particularly Calvinism, on the
emergence of capitalism in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism is an
important exception (line D). The analysis by Greif (1994) of how the differential
impact of the collectivist cultural endowments of Maghrebi traders and the
individualistic cultural endowments of Genoese traders influenced the development
of commercial institutions in the Mediterranean region in the eleventh and twelfth
centuries is a more recent example. Political scientist Ronald Inglehart employs a
model in which cultural endowments (value changes) respond to changes in resource
endowments (line f). Materialist values are stronger in poor societies that are resource
constrained, while wealthy societies are characterized by post-materialist (or postmodern) values (Inglehart 1997).
The effect of resource endowments on the international diffusion of institutions
has been explored by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). They found that,
25

For a dramatic example see Eggertsson (1996). Eggertsson poses the question of why Iceland, until
well into the nineteenth century, neglected to exploit its rich offshore fishing resources. His answer
was that the country was stuck in “a pernicious equilibrium trap that had an external and internal
component. The internal component was related to the economic self-interest of landlords and farmers
who feared that the development of high productivity fisheries would weaken the institutions that tied
labor to the land…. The external element was the policy of the Danish Crown of isolating the country
from foreign trade and taxing Icelanders by selling monopoly rights to trade with Iceland” (Eggertsson
1996, p. 21). These institutional constraints were broken only after a subsistence crisis in the latter
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
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where the disease environment was not favorable to settlement, European colonizers
established extractive states (such as Britain in the Gold Coast and Belgium in
Congo). Where the disease environment was favorable the European colonizers
established settler colonies. Where extractive states were established, legal
institutions were adopted that favored the extraction and transfer of resources to the
metropolitan country and, after independence, to the new ruling elites. In settler
colonies, in contrast, legal institutions that favored the rule of law and encouraged
investment were established. Those differences in legal culture and institutions
explain substantial differences in contemporary per capita income (lines c, f, and d).
A potential criticism of the pattern model depicted in Figure 1 is that it does not
stipulate the mechanisms through which changes in resource endowments, for
example, induce changes in technology. However it is not too difficult to visualize the
mechanisms that mediate the relationships among changes in resource endowments,
technical change, and institutional change. The market represents a “master
mechanism” for translating the uncoordinated behavior of individuals into systemlevel coordination (Hedström and Swedberg 1998, p. 3). It is somewhat more
difficult, however, to describe the mechanisms that link institutional change and
changes in cultural endowments in terms of the neoclassical model (other than as
metaphor). Another potential criticism of the pattern model of Figure 1 is that it is
“overdetermined.” Identification problems become intractable since every variable in
the system is subject to influences arising from changes in every other variable
(Resnick and Wolff 1987) But because changes in the different relationships in the
model occur at different rates, the identification problem, while difficult, is tractable.
Coleman, a leading social theorist of the last generation, advanced what he termed
a macro-micro-micro-macro model (Coleman 1986; 1990, pp. 1–23). In Figure 2 the
Coleman model is used to interpret the Weber thesis on the relationship between the
Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. Protestant theology inculcated a change
in social values among its adherents (line 1); individuals internalized new value
orientations (rationalism, antitraditionalism, asceticism) toward economic behavior
(line 2); the new value orientations resulted in the actions by individuals and groups
that induced the development of the economic institutions of capitalism (line 3).
Coleman argues that Weber’s own interpretation was incomplete because he did not
address the critical theoretical problem – how individual actions combined to produce
the unanticipated behavior of groups of individuals that brought about the economic
institutions of capitalism.26 “What is necessary to account for the growth or
26

Weber’s thesis has also been criticized for not attempting to explain the social forces that led to the
Protestant Reformation. The assertion by Douglas (1986, p. 36) that “Religion does not explain.
Religion has to be explained” is at least half correct. Thus at a deeper level it may be possible to
explain the emergence of Protestantism in terms of the economic changes associated with late
medieval urban development or even the early financial reforms of the Catholic church (Harsanyi
1960, p. 143; Lal 1998).
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occurrence of any social organization, whether capitalist organization or something
else, is how the structure of organizations come into being, how persons who come to
occupy each of the positions in the organization are motivated to do so, and how this
interdependent system of incentives is sustainable” (Coleman 1990, p. 9). Coleman’s
challenge to the social sciences research community has seldom been met.27

Figure 2. Macro- and Micro-level Propositions: Effects of Religious Doctrine on
Economic Organization
Adapted from Coleman 1990. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

Perspective

W

HAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS

of the theory of induced institutional innovation
for research on the contribution of social science knowledge to economic
development? In my research, with Hayami and Binswanger, on the direction and rate
of technical change, we were able to advance significantly our knowledge by treating
technical change as largely endogenous – as induced primarily by changes in relative
resource endowments and the growth of demand. We were also able to interpret the
advances in knowledge about the role of changes in the economic environment on the
rate and direction of technical change for the design of research systems and the
allocation of research resources (Ruttan 1982, 2001).

27

The issue of whether adherence to the extreme methodological individualism implied by Coleman’s
stipulation is necessary to understand social behavior is a source of continuing debate in the social
sciences. One response is to argue that, while desirable, it imposes a demand on social science research
that cannot be met in practice. But even if it could be met would it be sufficient? The answer to this
question appears to be negative. Variables that are not attached exclusively to individuals, such as
culture and technology, are essential to efforts to understand the behavior of economic systems and,
more broadly, of social systems (Arrow 1994; Satz and Ferejohn 1994).
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In this chapter I have presented a theory of induced institutional change. I argue
that the theory has advanced our understanding of the process of institutional change.
It suggests that substantial new insights have been obtained by treating institutional
change as an economic response to changes in resource endowments and to technical
change. But, as in the case of technical change, my concern goes beyond advancing
our understanding of the process of institutional innovation. It is essential for the
social sciences to advance our understanding of the historical processes of social and
economic development. But that is not sufficient! If social science knowledge is to be
valued by society it must also advance the knowledge to successfully intervene in the
process of development – to reduce the cost of the “trial and error” – that has been the
constant companion of the historic “organic” processes of institutional innovation.
I have also insisted on the significance of cultural endowments, including the
factors that economists typically conceal under the rubric of tastes and that political
scientists include under ideology, for economic development. In an article published
in the mid-1980s, Yujiro Hayami and I insisted that until our colleagues in the other
social sciences provided us with more helpful analytical tools, we would be forced to
adhere to a strategy that focused primarily on the interactions between resource
endowments, technical change, and institutional change (Ruttan and Hayami 1984).
This strategy had the clear advantage of allowing us to explore how far a strategy
based on the rather straightforward extension of standard neoclassical microeconomic
theory could take us in advancing our understanding of institutional change.28
In spite of the fact that this strategy has yielded very substantial insight into the
process of institutional change, I do not regard it as a very satisfactory conclusion.
Beginning in the mid-1980s I initiated a program of research and writing designed to
explore in greater depth what development economists should learn from scholars in
the other nomothetic social sciences – anthropology, sociology, and political science –
working in the field of development. My recent book, Social Science Knowledge and
Economic Development (Ruttan 2003), grew out of that effort.
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